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ARTICLE
OTHERING AND THE LAW
SUSAN J. STABILE*
INTRODUCTION
Although some of our laws address the needs of citizens of the United
States as a whole, many of our laws are designed to address the conditions
and needs of one or more discreet subsets of the population. Thus, we de-
bate the merits of laws addressing, for example, illegal immigrants, the
poor, and criminals.
Our view of the issues relating to the needs and conditions of different
groups of persons, and, therefore, of the legal strategies designed to address
those needs and conditions, is very much affected by the fact that often the
population subset we are talking about is not viewed as “us,” in the way we
think of ourselves. Rather, they are “others.”
The contention of this Article is that an underlying attitude of “other-
ing” pervades current discussions about what the law should and should not
do to address the conditions and needs of various categories of persons.
Although we do not necessarily acknowledge it, the fact that our discus-
sions proceed from a view of the people whose situations or problems being
discussed as “other” makes a difference in how we evaluate various legal
and public policy initiatives. The corollary is that if, instead of proceeding
from a view of others as fundamentally “not us,” we possessed an attitude
of solidarity, of valuing others and seeing them as not separate or other, our
views on any number of issues of public policy might be very different.
The fact that othering affects our evaluation of public policy issues has
implications regarding the role of law. That is, we need to be conscious of
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the ways the structure of law and public policy promotes either othering, or
a view of human persons as possessing equal dignity and being part of a
communal whole.
I am not concerned in this Article with a detailed discussion or resolu-
tion of any particular question of law or public policy; scholars have ad-
dressed how othering permeates legal discourse in areas as diverse as
human trafficking1 and intercountry adoptions.2 Instead, although of neces-
sity I will use particular examples to highlight the problem, my focus here
is the attitude of othering itself and how the law might help move us to a
different perspective. I begin in Section I by discussing the prevalence of
othering, as well as the forces that promote this way of viewing others.
Section II explores how othering infects public policy debates on any num-
ber of issues. Section III articulates a vision of the human person and
human relations that I believe should be the foundation and ideal for our
legal system, a view very much at odds with othering. Finally, Section IV
addresses how the law might move us from an attitude of othering to one of
communion.
I. OTHERING AND ITS MANIFESTATIONS
A. The Process of Othering
“Othering” refers to a process by which individuals and society view
and label people who are different in a way that devalues them.3 Othering
“operates across multiple dimensions to reinforce a conception of a virtuous
‘Self’ and a lesser ‘Other.’”4 We determine that certain people are “not us,”
and that determination “functions to create . . . a devalued and dehumanized
Other,” and a distancing of the other from ourselves.5 That obviously af-
fects how we view such persons’ needs and interests.
1. Jonathan Todres, Law, Otherness, and Human Trafficking, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 605
(2009) (arguing that othering is a root cause of inaction in addressing human trafficking).
2. Shani King, Challenging Monohumanism: An Argument for Changing the Way We Think
about Intercountry Adoption, 30 MICH. J. INT’L LAW 413 (2009). See also Carlo A. Pedrioli,
Constructing the Other: U.S. Muslims, Anti-Sharia Law, and the Constitutional Consequences of
Volatile Intercultural Rhetoric, 22 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 65 (2012) (discussing the othering of
Muslims in the U.S.).
3. When I talk about the “other” and “othering,” I am not referring to the bare psychological
process by which an individual establishes her identity by distinguishing between the self and
other persons. There has been some discussion of this othering process in social science literature.
See, e.g., Alex Gillespie, Collapsing Self/Other Positions: Identification Through Differentiation,
46 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCH. 579 (2006); Vivian L. Vignoles et al., Beyond Self-Esteem: Influence of
Multiple Motives on Identity Construction, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 308 (2007); Jack K.
Martin et al., Of Fear and Loathing: The Role of “Disturbing Behavior,” Labels, and Causal
Attributions in Shaping Public Attitudes Toward People with Mental Illness, 41 J. HEALTH & SOC.
BEHAV. 208 (2000).
4. Todres, supra note 1, at 607. R
5. Id. at 614. See Pedrioli, supra note 2, at 72 (arguing that the discourse of othering dehu- R
manizes the other, justifying negative action toward them).
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Othering is not identical with stereotyping. Stereotyping puts others in
particular categories that are then used “to simplify the task of perceiving,
processing, and retaining information about people in memory.”6 Stereotyp-
ing involves making judgments about a person based on perceived charac-
teristics of the particular group to which the person belongs rather than on
an individual assessment of the person.7 Othering does not necessarily de-
pend on forming particular judgments about the characteristics of a particu-
lar group, although it may, or drawing conclusions about a particular person
based on characteristics of the group of which he is a part.8 Rather, the
judgment is more broadly a judgment that the other in question is “not me,”
or “not us.” Stereotyping can be a manifestation of othering, and, like other-
ing, often operates more unconsciously than consciously.9 However, it does
not necessarily carry a judgment that the “other” is less than oneself.10
6. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995).
7. “[O]nce in place, stereotypes bias intergroup judgment and decisionmaking . . . func-
tion[ing] as implicit theories, biasing in predictable ways the perception, interpretation, encoding,
retention, and recall of information about other people.” Id.
8. Stereotyping involves making associations between a particular group and particular
traits. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foun-
dations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 949–50 (2006) (defining a “social stereotype” as “a mental associa-
tion between a social group or category and a trait”). Whereas othering says simply, that person
(who may be poor, or Asian or black, or homosexual) is different from me, stereotyping involves
judgments that, “the poor are lazy and shiftless” or “Asians are good in science,” etc. A 2008
study provides a good example of stereotyping. A group of people were asked to look at two
pictures of identical women, except that in one picture the woman was wearing an Islamic head-
scarf. Not only was the covered woman perceived as more traditional and wealthier, but subjects
displayed an aversion to her that they did not display toward the same woman without the scarf.
Arthur Kover, See What a Difference a Shawl Makes (Jan. 4, 2008), http://www.mediacurves
.com/Culture/J6652/.
9. See Krieger, supra note 6, at 1188 (pointing out that stereotypes “operate beyond the
reach of decisionmaker self-awareness”). See also Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and
Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005). Krieger suggests that stereotype biases
“operate absent intent to favor or disfavor members of a particular social group.” Krieger, supra
note 6, at 1188. See also John F. Dovidio et al., Contemporary Racial Bias: When Good People
Do Bad Things, in THE SOC. PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND EVIL 141, 144 (Arthur G. Miller ed.,
2004) (discussing the fact that racial bias “may occur spontaneously, automatically, and without
full awareness”). Ivan Bodensteiner, however, argues that “choos[ing] to make decisions based on
stereotypes rather than individual assessments [involves] a conscious decision to disfavor mem-
bers of groups he views negatively.”  Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological
Research Related to Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional Dis-
crimination, 73 MO. L. REV. 83, 85 (2008).
10. An example of such a stereotype is that notion that all Asians are good at math and
science. Othering is much closer to what Judge Noonan calls “masks,” by which he means the
“legal construct suppressing the humanity of a participant in the [legal] process.” JOHN T. NOO-
NAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 20 (2002). But even there, although Noonan suggests
that “masks may be seen as devices reflecting the structure of society and the degrees of its
acknowledgement of humanity in different groups,” id. at 23, therefore operating similarly to
othering in its effect, for Noonan, it is the fact that there are points “where it is too much [for the
legal system] to recognize that a human being exists” that results in the creation of masks. Id. at
26.
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The starting point of the process of othering is fairly benign. We all
identify ourselves as parts of various groups—ethnic, religious, racial, fa-
milial, geographic—and it is that identification that creates a separation be-
tween those in the group and those outside. When I say: I’m a New York
City born and bred, Caucasian, Catholic, female of Italian-American heri-
tage, to at least some degree, I exclude from me—from who and what I
am—non-Caucasian, non-Catholic, male, Irish, Polish, non-New York, ru-
ral, and so on. I define myself in a way that makes others different from me.
The psychologist Erik Erikson refers to this as “pseudo-speciation,” a
term that “denotes the fact that while man is obviously one species, he ap-
pears . . . on the scene split up into groups (from tribes to nations, from
castes to classes, from religions to ideologies) which provide their members
with a firm sense of distinct and superior identity and immortality.”11 This
behavior is transmitted from one generation to the next, forming different
cultures.12 A group sees the similarities of its members and forms a culture,
and when it does, it sees that culture as separate from those who do not fall
into the group.
Note that Erikson speaks of a development of not only a distinct, but a
superior identity. Quite easily, those who are “not us” come to be seen not
only as different, but as less than us. Jane Goodall observed a startling ex-
ample of this in her study of chimpanzees.13 An extended family of chimps
split into two groups, one moving to the south and another to the north. It
took no more than a couple of years for the family to split into “us” and
“others” and for tensions to mount so high that one group literally annihi-
lated the other and inflicted on them the kind of injuries that are generally
only seen when chimpanzees are trying to kill a large prey animal of an-
other species.14 Goodall observed that this was not a fear of strangers since
the members of the Kahama community were familiar to their aggressors.
“The members of the Kahama community had, before the split, enjoyed
close and friendly relations with their aggressors; in some cases they had
11. ERIK H. ERIKSON, GANDHI’S TRUTH 431 (1969). See ERIK H. ERIKSON, INSIGHT AND
RESPONSIBILITY 125–26 (1964); Rodney D. Olsen, Identity’s Architect: A Biography of Erik H.
Erikson, 87 J. OF AM. HIST. 1112 (2000).
12. Id.; see also Tony Smith, Social Violence and Conservative Social Psychology: The Case
of Erik Erikson 13 J. PEACE RES. 1 (1976).
13. See generally JANE GOODALL, REASON FOR HOPE (1999) [hereinafter REASON FOR
HOPE]; JANE GOODALL, THROUGH A WINDOW (1990) [hereinafter THROUGH A WINDOW]; see also
CAROL LEE FLINDERS, ENDURING LIVES 97–182 (2006) (discussing Goodall’s work).
14. REASON FOR HOPE, supra note 13, at 130–31 (observing that when the Kasakela males R
attacked Kahama chimps, they “showed aggressive patterns not seen during fights with members
of their own community, yet seen regularly when chimpanzees are trying to incapacitate and
dismember a large prey animal”); THROUGH A WINDOW, supra note 13, at 210 (observing that R
some of the patterns of attack had “never been seen during fights between members of the same
community—the twisting of limbs, the tearing off of strips of skin, the drinking of blood” and was
usually seen only when chimpanzees are trying to kill adult prey animals).
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grown up with them and had traveled, fed, played, groomed, and slept
together.”15
What accounted for this behavior? The answer, explains Goodall, is
that the chimps had done what human beings do all the time. They had
“pseudo-speciated.”16 Goodall writes, “[b]y separating themselves, it was as
though they forfeited their ‘right’ to be treated as group members.”17 They
became strangers, others.
What Goodall observed in the chimps is not much different from what
we saw in the early 1990s in Bosnia or in 1994 in Rwanda. The partition of
Yugoslavia in World War II set the stage for growing conflict between
Serbs and Bosnian Muslims.18 These two groups “who hated each other so
much . . . were all but indistinguishable in their facial traits. It was only by
their names that you could tell them apart.”19 The conflict, which then U.S.
Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke called the “largest failure of the West
since the 1930s,”20 resulted in the death of over 200,000 Muslim civilians
and ten times that number becoming refugees.21
In a similar vein, from April to July of 1994, the people of Rwanda
suffered a genocide that claimed almost a million lives as the Hutus slaugh-
tered members of the Tutsis.22 The two groups shared the same language
and the same culture, but the tall and thin Tutsis, who had been favored by
the Belgians before Rwandan independence, were resented by the short and
stocky Hutus and blamed for many problems that occurred after indepen-
dence. So the Hutus rose up and attempted to annihilate the Tutsis.23 I’m
not suggesting here that there may not have been abuse of the Hutus by the
Tutsis at various times. The point, however, is that two ethnically similar
groups that “[spoke] the same language, inhabit[ed] the same areas and fol-
15. REASON FOR HOPE, supra note 13, at 130; see also ENDURING LIVES, supra note 13, at
148 (noting that “[t]he Kasakela chimps weren’t just savaging members of their own species, they
were killing friends, and probably cousins, with whom they had hunted and played and slept”).
16. REASON FOR HOPE, supra note 13, at 129–30.
17. THROUGH A WINDOW, supra note 13, at 210; REASON FOR HOPE, supra note 13, at
130–31 (observing that the Kahama chimps were treated as though “they were thouroughly ‘de-
chimpized’”).
18. See generally Partick Thursfield, The Partition of Yugoslavia: A Nazi Plan Recalled, 279
CONTEMP. REV. 162 (Sept. 2001).
19. George M. Anderson, Roots of Genocide: Francis M. Deng Discusses Cultural Denial,
Self-hatred and Prejudice, AMERICA, Feb. 9, 2009, at 16.
20. Tim Weiner, Clinton’s Balkan Envoy Finds Himself Shut Out, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,
1995, at A5.
21. See, e.g., SABINA RAMET, BALKAN BABEL: THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA FROM
THE DEATH OF TITO TO THE FALL OF MILOSEVIC 156, 347 (2002).
22. Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Mar. 1999), http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/r/rwanda/rwanda993.pdf; Rwanda: How the
Genocide Happened, BBC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ 1288230.stm
[hereinafter How the Genocide Happened].
23. Forges, supra note 22.
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low[ed] the same traditions”24 came to view each other in a way that made
annihilation of the other seem reasonable.
“Pseudo-speciation” results in denigrating others based on the ways
they are different from us culturally, behaviorally, or otherwise. Goodall
opines that “[o]ur tendency to form select in-groups from which we exclude
those who do not share our ethnic background, socioeconomic position, po-
litical persuasions, religious beliefs, and so on is one of the major causes of
war, rioting, gang violence and other kinds of conflict.”25 We may not nec-
essarily have “conscious, intentional control over the processes of social
perception, impression formation, and judgment”26 that creates othering.
Nonetheless, “othering” comes in many forms and in various degrees. It
appears as fascism, racism, misogyny, homophobia, and religious and eth-
nic hatred.27 It also appears as discrimination against the aged and against
those with physical disabilities and mental and emotional illnesses.
Even when othering doesn’t lead to the commission of horrendous acts
against those who we label as others, it quite often has the effect of exclud-
ing others from our locus of concern.28 Think, for example, of Western
reaction to reports of atrocities in places far away. With respect to the geno-
cide in Rwanda, which I already mentioned, there is a very poignant scene
in the 2005 movie Hotel Rwanda where Don Cheadle—playing the hotel
manager Paul Rusesabagina, who risked his life trying to save as many
Tutsis as he could—suggests that once the West has seen news reports of
what is happening, they will stop it. Surely, he says, once they see what is
going on they will not allow it to continue. The response of the world-
weary and much more realistic Western reporter bursts the hotel manager’s
hopes. The reporter shakes his head and says it won’t matter, that (in a line
repeated by the movie’s director Terry George): “It’s simple, African lives
24. How the Genocide Happened, supra note 22.
25. REASON FOR HOPE, supra note 13, at 131 (suggesting also that the reason Golding’s Lord
of the Flies is “a terrifying novel [is] because we know that children, given the right (or, rather the
wrong) environment, can behave barbarically” and that “cultural speciation is obvious in the terri-
fying evolution of modern gangs”).
26. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 8, at 946.
27. We are seeing the horrific effects of religious-based othering in the behavior of Islamic
militants. Hirsi Ali catalogues some of the recent examples and argues that “the violent acts of
radical Islam [cannot] be divorced from the religious ideals that inspire them.” AYAAN HIRSI ALI,
HERETIC: WHY ISLAM NEEDS A REFORMATION NOW 2 (2015).
28. Those in the disability movement have long recognized that social barriers create disabil-
ity and “that the difficulties of living as a disabled person are due to discrimination and prejudice,
rather than impairment.” See Tom Shakespeare, Choices and Rights: Eugenics, Genetics and
Disability Equality, 13 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 665, 669 (1998); see also Adrienne Asch, The Human
Genome and Disability Rights, DISABILITY RAG AND RES. 12 (Jan.–Feb. 1994) (arguing that the
premise of the disability rights movement is that persons with disabilities are disadvantaged far
more by negative social attitudes than by their disabilities). Othering also has other potential
effects, for example, the danger that we view voting as “a tribalistic exercise in which we express
our sympathy for the candidate who most reminds us of ourselves.” Don’t Vote ‘Yay’, COMMON-
WEALTH, Oct. 10, 2008, at 5.
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are not seen as valuable as the lives of Europeans or Americans.”29 Written
that way, the words sound harsh, but in fact, the international community
turned a blind eye to what happened in Rwanda.
Afterwards, Western leaders vowed, “Never again.”30 Yet, how much
clamor do you hear—in your own heart or on the streets—over the fact that
200,000 Syrians have lost their lives in years of armed conflict.31 Where is
the clamor? The same can be said for any number of other examples. How
much of an outcry do we hear about the mass killings of civilians in South
Sudan?32 Or about human trafficking in places like Thailand?33
I suspect the same may be at play in the attitudes of at least some
people toward U.S. intervention in Syria, the war in Iraq, and, further back
in time, the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. Let me be clear:
in my opinion there are legitimate reasons one might oppose any of these
military engagements. However, Syrians tend to get less concern from
Americans simply because they are Muslim, a group Americans feel more
negatively about than any other group.34 Many expressed opposition to mil-
itary intervention in Iraq on the grounds that the Iraqis were not worthy of
our attention because they are primitive or prone to violence.35 And I sus-
pect swallowing the abandonment of the South Vietnamese was easier for
many Americans to accept than the abandonment of a Western nation
would have been.
Distance may account for some of the lack of concern with the plight
of those living in places many Americans cannot even find on a map, but it
clearly does not provide a total explanation since we can find many similar
examples that are much more proximate. Consider, for example, the early
days of the AIDS epidemic. Early on, very little attention was focused on
AIDS and not a tremendous amount of effort put into research for treatment
29. HOTEL RWANDA (MGM 2005).
30. See Robert Walker, Rwanda Remembers the Holocaust, BBC NEWS (Jan. 27, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4211621.stm; see also Barbara Crossette, In Face of African Cri-
sis, No Plans for World Action, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 1996), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage
.html?res=9C03E7DB1638F931A35752C1A960958260.
31. Lucy Roberts et al., Syria: The Story of the Conflict, BBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2015), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868.
32. South Sudan: One Year After Mass Killings in Bentiu, Violence and Displacement Con-
tinue, DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/ arti-
cle/south-sudan-one-year-after-mass-killings-bentiu-violence-and-displacement-continue.
33. Sophie Brown, Tackling Thailand’s Human Trafficking Problem, CNN (June 21, 2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/20/world/asia/thailand-trafficking-report/.
34. See How Americans Feel About Religious Groups, PEW RES. CTR. (July 16, 2014), http://
www.pewforum.org/2014/07/16/how-americans-feel-about-religious-groups/.
35. See, e.g., Victor Davis Hanson, The Vision Thing, NAT. REV. (Oct. 17, 2003), http://www
.nationalreview.com/hanson/hanson200310170838.asp (suggesting that “[m]ost Americans, tragi-
cally so, do not find from thirty second film clips that the Iraqi people are all that sympathetic, but
rather—after the war, the looting, the suicide bombings, and the complaining—that they are not
worth the billions of dollars and the lost lives”). See David Pipes, An Iraqi [Cultural] Tragedy,
N.Y. POST (Apr. 22, 2003) (speaking of the “inherently violent quality of modern Iraqi society”).
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and cure of the disease. Why? Because in the beginning, what did we call
AIDS? It was the gay disease.36 Not only did this have nothing to do with
“us,” but many people said and thought things like “[t]hey had it coming”
or “[t]hat’s what they get for their unnatural behavior.” Or, worse, “AIDS is
God’s punishment for homosexuality.” The only people other than homo-
sexuals who we heard of getting AIDS in those early days were drug ad-
dicts and Haitians and they were no more “us” than were homosexuals.
Only after there started to be significant numbers of AIDS cases among
heterosexuals—heterosexuals like “us”—did the disease become something
to be taken seriously.
We see the same thing in people’s reactions to news stories about
crimes. One of my friends who teaches criminal law once told me that his
students have no hesitance admitting that they pay more attention to crimes
committed against people like them, whether on racial or, more likely, so-
cioeconomic grounds as identified by neighborhood. They are less bothered
about crimes committed against people who are different. One online news
report of the murder of five prostitutes in England a few years ago painfully
illustrates the extent to which our reaction to crime depends on our judg-
ment of the victim. The article observed that, “in the scheme of things the
deaths of these five women is no great loss. They weren’t going to discover
a cure for cancer or embark on missionary work in Darfur.”37 Like other
marginalized groups, prostitutes are others; they simply matter less.38 More
36. Before the term “AIDS” began to be used, the illness was referred to as the “gay plague,”
“gay cancer,” or “gay-related immune deficiency.” See Steve Sternberg, Profile: Generation
AIDS, USA TODAY (June 5, 2006), http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2006-06-04-aids-anni-
versary_x.htm; Joe Wright, Remembering the Early Days of “Gay Cancer”, NPR (May 8, 2006),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5391495.
37. Richard Littlejohn, Spare us the ‘People’s Prostitute’ Thing, DAILY MAIL. (Dec. 18,
2006), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/columnists/article-423549/Littlejohn-Spare-Peoples-
Prostitute-routine-.html.
38. I don’t mean to suggest that othering operates universally; there clearly are exceptions.
The Tsunami, for example, generated a tremendous charitable outpouring among Americans, de-
spite the fact that it happened someplace a significant number of Americans probably couldn’t
locate on a map. See Philip Rucker, In U.S., A Multitude of Forces Drains the Spirit of Giving,
WASH. POST (May 23, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/22/
AR2008052204116_pf.html (noting that Americans donated $207 million in the first five days
after the Tsunami hit). And people from all around the country sent money and goods to New
Orleans or traveled there themselves to help with the rebuilding after Hurricane Katrina. See id.
(noting that Americans donated $226 million in the five days after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita). It
may be that natural disasters don’t so easily give rise to a response of othering: even though the
victims of a particular natural disaster are different from us, we could as easily be the victim of a
natural disaster ourselves so the victims are not inherently other. But, more broadly, it may be that
charitable impulses are just different. That is, it may be that people are simply willing to give
notwithstanding the othering of the recipient of our charity. One can write a check while still
maintaining a distance from the other and while maintaining a sense of power and control over the
other—not to mention getting a tax deduction for the act. In any event, even if one could find
examples that suggest the othering tendency is not universal, it is clear that it exerts a strong pull
on many people.
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recently, the Black Lives Matter movement39 is a response to the fact that
crimes against blacks—including state violence against blacks—have failed
to receive the attention they deserve.
B. Factors that Reinforce Our Othering Tendencies
Apart from the natural process by which we identify ourselves by the
groups of which we are a part, there are a number of forces that contribute
to othering and that contribute to our devaluation of those we label as other.
This Section addresses three important factors: religion, culture, and law.
1. Religion and Othering
Religious thought has a tremendous potential to promote a sense of
communion and interrelatedness of human beings that is at odds with the
othering I have been discussing.40 Lamentably, religion has not always
lived up to that potential, instead, often serving to promote an othering that
devalues others.
Religion has far too often operated in the world as a means of dividing
people. For many, the belief that their religion possesses a monopoly on
truth has led to a need to denigrate those possessing different views. As we
all know from our history, I am talking about more than merely unex-
pressed feelings of superiority. Instead, religious adherents have, over the
years, zealously sought to advance their religion by violent and atrocious
means. The Crusades were undertaken under the battle cry “Deus Vult”
(God wills it) to destroy Jews and Moslems in the Holy Land.41 Islamic
jihadists, believing themselves mandated to do so by the Koran, have killed
millions over the centuries.42 In the 1900s, Muslim Turks waged genocide
against Christian Armenians.43 Our more recent history has included years
of conflict in Northern Ireland between Protestants and Catholics,44 ongo-
ing violence between Arabs and Jews,45 and the present violent activities of
39. See generally BLACK LIVES MATTER, http://blacklivesmatter.com/ (last visited Sept. 20,
2015).
40. See infra text accompanying Section III.
41. JAMES MORWOOD, A DICTIONARY OF LATIN WORDS AND PHRASES 46 (1998).
42. Theodore Gabriel, Ethical and Religious Traditions, Eastern, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF VIO-
LENCE, PEACE, AND CONFLICT 704–06 (Lester R. Kurtz ed., 2008).
43. See generally TANER Akcam, A SHAMEFUL ACT: THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND THE
QUESTION OF TURKISH RESPONSIBILITY (2006).
44. See, e.g., William Borders, Families Shift Homes in an Inflamed Ulster, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 1981, at 11; James F. Clairity, After Six Killings, the Old Sadness in Ulster: A Raid on a
Pub by Protestant Gunmen is Widely Condemned, N. Y. TIMES, June 20, 1994, at A3; A Pregnant
Catholic Woman is Shot Dead in Northern Ireland, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1994, at A2.
45. See, e.g., Marc D. Charney, History Leaves the Talks a Bitter Tangle to Untie, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 1991, at E2; Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Imagine a Palestinian State—The Dream: It
Would be Democratic, Secular and at Peace, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1988, at A21.
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the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).46 Incredible death and barbaric
behavior toward others, all in the name of religion. These are the things that
lead people like Christopher Hitchens to claim that religion “has been an
enormous multiplier of tribal suspicion and hatred”47 that “must seek to
interfere with the lives of nonbelievers, or heretics, or adherents of other
faiths.”48
Left unchecked, many people will use religion as an excuse for other-
ing. Even where it does not lead to violence, a fundamentalist approach to
religion often leads to a lack of willingness to associate with others not of
the same religion.49 It is reflective of the desire of some religious groups to
remain separate that a 1998 documentary on the life of Hasidic Jews in
America—primarily in New York—was titled, A Life Apart.50
2. Contribution of Cultural Forces to Othering
Cultural forces can be very powerful in shaping our reactions. Much of
our understanding of the meaning of concepts such as justice, truth, and
freedom are a function of the culture that steeps our lives. As a result, cul-
tural forces also contribute to “othering.”  David Brooks wrote an op-ed in
the New York Times several years ago titled “The Segmented Society.”51
In it, he suggested that we “live in an age in which the technological and
commercial momentum drives fragmentation.”52 The particular example he
explored was the fragmentation of the music industry and of the present
musical culture’s loss of contact with its common roots. Music, however, is
only one aspect of our increasing loss of cohesion and “in any given indus-
try, companies are dividing the marketplace into narrower and more seg-
46. See Graeme Wood, What ISIS Really Wants, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 2015 (describing the
“medieval religious nature” of ISIS). Notwithstanding President Obama’s assertion that “ISIL is
not ‘Islamic’” (see Ashley Killough, Strong Reaction to Obama Statement, CNN NEWS, Sept. 11,
2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/obama-isil-not-islamic/), it is clear that many Mus-
lims believe there is an “imperative to wage jihad, or holy war.” ALI, supra note 27, at 24. R
47. CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: HOW RELIGION POISONS EVERYTHING 36
(2007).
48. Id. at 17.
49. See KAREN ARMSTRONG, THE BATTLE FOR GOD, at xi (2000) (“[T]o avoid contamination,
[fundamentalists] often withdraw from mainstream society to create a counterculture.”). Intended
or not, that conveys the sense that those not of the religion in question are at a minimum other and
worse, less valuable as human persons. In the words of one commentator, “[r]eligious fundamen-
talism is divisive. Instead of uniting societies, it produces isolation and hostility.” Darrell Wil-
liams, Religious Fundamentalism Versus Tolerance, AM. CHRON. (Oct. 10, 2007), http://www
.americanchronicle.com/articles/39850. There is, of course, the danger of “othering” fundamental-
ists. As with other labels, the label fundamentalist is used as a way to distance those labeled from
ourselves. It is a term that is almost always used pejoratively as a way of suggesting people who
are dangerous, different, and not quite to be trusted and a term that is often applied incorrectly to
anyone whose views seem too conservative or orthodox.
50. A LIFE APART: HASIDISM IN AMERICA (PBS 1998). You can find information on the film
at http://www.pbs.org/alifeapart/index.html.
51. David Brooks, The Segmented Society, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2007, at A23.
52. Id.
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mented life-style niches.”53 Brooks suggested that anxiety about
fragmentation and a longing for cohesion are “the driving fear[s] behind the
inequality and immigration debates, behind worries of polarization” and
talks about the need for “institutions that span social, class, and ethnic
lines.”54 That segmentation has only increased in the years since Brooks
wrote of it.
Nor is technology the only culprit here. Within the last few decades,
the American ideal has shifted “from assimilation to ethnicity, from integra-
tion to separatism.”55 We see examples of this in the efforts to embrace
Ebonics in American classrooms and other educational policies fostering
multiculturalism56 as well as in strategies for integrating immigrants into
American life.57
Obviously, cultural pluralism is “necessity in an ethnically diversified
society,”58 such as the one which exists in the United States today. Mul-
ticulturalism does not necessarily entail superiority of one group over an-
other, and to the extent it takes the form of recognizing the value and
contributions of each of the various subgroups that make up our culture, it
is both valuable and necessary.59
However, there is a danger. Speaking in constitutional terms, Mark
Tushnet wrote, “[i]n important ways the Constitution, with its opening
words ‘We the People of the United States,’ is a document about national
unity; a document that tries to create—at least through rhetoric—a  single
people of the United States, notwithstanding our wide differences. Certain
kinds of multiculturalism deny the possibility that there could be a single
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A MUL-
TICULTURAL SOCIETY 2 (1991). See Lawrence E. Harrison, The End of Multiculturalism, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 26, 2008), http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0226/p09s01-coop.html
(observing that “multiculturalism has become a dominant feature of the political and intellectual
landscape of the West” since the 1960s).
56. Ebonics is a language system characteristic of African Americans with roots in West
Africa.  It is sometimes also called Black English, Black Vernacular English or African-American
Vernacular English.  For a discussion of the Ebonics movement, see, for example, THERESA
PERRY & LISA D. DELPIT, THE REAL EBONICS DEBATE: POWER LANGUAGE, AND THE EDUCATION
OF AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN (1998); JOHN RICKFORD, AFRICAN AMERICAN VERNACULAR
ENGLISH: FEATURES AND USE, EVOLUTION AND EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS (1999).
57. See VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, MEXIFORNIA: A STATE OF BECOMING (2004) (discussing
move from assimilation to multiculturalism model for integrating immigrants and downsides of
the shift).
58. SCHLESINGER, supra note 55, at 40.
59. Thus, for example, a “multicultural curriculum [that] features Africa and African
achievements . . . teach[es] some of the wonders of human achievement and substantiate the truth
about innate black equality.” Maurice E.R. Munroe, Unamerican Tail: Of Segregation and Mul-
ticultural Education, 64 ALB. L. REV. 241, 305–06 (2000).
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people of the United States.”60 Thus, multiculturalism has the potential to
foster a separatism that “corrodes all sense of community.”61
3. The Reinforcement Effect of Law and Politics
The law also plays a tremendous role in promoting othering. Law does
more than simply regulate behavior. It also has both an expressive and ped-
agogic function.62 Whatever else it does, the law “imbues a vision of how
the members of a particular society should live their lives together.”63
By “law,” I mean not simply legislative enactments and judicial deci-
sions, but also both the behavior of executive officials and those charged
with enforcing the law and the expression of views by other government
officials about how law and society should function. Not only does posi-
tively enacted legislation have the potential to institutionalize pseudo-speci-
ation, but judicial decisions and the behavior of individual government
officials often proceed from an attitude of othering and effectively legiti-
mize such behavior, expressing to the citizenry that some people can be
disregarded.
Several examples illustrate the potential of legislative and judicial law
to legitimate othering. First, the internment of Japanese-Americans during
World War II was effected pursuant to congressional legislation. That legis-
lation was upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States.64 In
the words of Justice Roberts, who dissented from the majority opinion in
Korematsu, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of “a citizen as a pun-
ishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a concentration camp, based
on his ancestry, and solely because of his ancestry, without evidence of
inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the United
60. Mark Tushnet, Thinking about the Constitution at the Cusp, 34 AKRON L. REV. 21, 34
(2000); see also SCHLESINGER, supra note 55, at 58 (noting that “[t]he cult of ethnicity exaggerates
differences, intensifies resentments and antagonisms, drives ever deeper the awful wedges be-
tween races and nationalities”).
61. George W. Dent Jr., Secularism and the Supreme Court, BYU. L. REV. 1, 36–37 (1999)
(arguing that “[s]ocial rifts are deepened by multiculturalism, a theory that people should find
meaning in their identity, which derives from sex, ethnicity, and sexual orientation”); see also
Ayelet Schachar, Two Critiques of Multiculturalism, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 259 (2001) (dis-
cussing “external” critique of multiculturalism, citing critics who worry that multiculturalism has
the potential to “harden[ ] cultural identities into political categories”).
62. Rick Garnett spoke of the expressive and pedagogic function of the law in a 2007 collo-
quy on the Mirror of Justice weblog in the context of a discussion on the effect of a law subsi-
dizing contraceptive use by college students. See Rick Garnett, Response to Michael, MIRROR OF
JUSTICE (Nov. 25, 2007), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2007/11/response-to-
mic.html; Rick Garnett, Explaining My No, MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Nov. 24, 2007), http://mir-
rorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2007/11/explaining-my-n.html (“[L]aw has not only a di-
rect social-control function but also ‘expressive’ and ‘pedagogical’ functions and effects.”).
63. M. Cathleen Kaveny, Autonomy, Solidarity and Law’s Pedagogy, 27 LOUVAIN STUD.
339, 341, 350 (2002). See infra Section IV.B for a further discussion of the pedagogical function
of the law.
64. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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States.”65 Justice Murphy, in his dissenting opinion, made reference to the
government’s “blanket condemnation of all persons of Japanese descent”
with no evidence that such individuals were disloyal or had conducted
themselves so as to constitute any menace to U.S. interests. He cited lan-
guage in the military’s report on the evacuation of the Pacific Coast area
referring “to all individuals of Japanese descent as ‘subversive,’ [and] as
belonging to ‘an enemy race’ whose ‘racial strains are undiluted.’”66 The
action of the legislature, the military, and the judiciary legitimated the treat-
ment of all Japanese-Americans as “other” and, therefore, as not entitled to
the consideration we would demand for ourselves. The legal behavior con-
stituted, in the words of Justice Murphy, the “legalization of racism.”67 The
government does the same thing today when it approves of the use of tor-
ture and otherwise inhumane treatment of Muslim detainees in the name of
fighting a war against terrorism.68
A second example is provided by Cathleen Kaveny in an article in
which she discusses the pedagogical function of the law.69 She discusses
laws colloquially referred to as the “Ugly Law,” statutes that existed in a
number of states until the early 1970s that prohibited those who were “dis-
eased, maimed, mutilated or in any [way visibly] deformed” to appear in
public places or on the public streets.70 It is not just that such laws had an
effect on the activities of disabled persons on the streets. The bigger con-
cern, notes Kaveny, is the message sent by the law. The law’s “concrete
prohibitions and penalties are infused with a morally freighted vision of
how human beings should live their lives together.”71 And the effect of the
law extends beyond the actual prohibitions.72 “Assuming the citizens of
Chicago internalize the normative vision of the worth of persons with disa-
bilities presupposed by the law, how will they act in contexts not explicitly
governed by it?”73 The law will clearly affect how people relate to persons
with disabilities in whatever environment they confront them.
65. Id. at 226 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 236 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
68. U.S Senate Report Slams CIA Torture, Lies, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 10, 2014),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/10/us-senate-report-slams-cia-torture-lies; United States of
America, A Case to Answer: From Abu Ghraib to Secret CIA Custody, AMNESTY INT’L USA
(Mar. 2008), http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGAMR510132008.
69. See Kaveny, supra note 63.
70. Id. (citing CHICAGO, ILL., CODE § 36034 (repealed 1974)).
71. Id. at 340.
72. See Sonia M. Suter, A Brave New World of Designer Babies?, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
897, 955 (2007) (arguing that “[m]ajority views regarding disabilities often reflect the able-
bodieds’ misperceptions and stereotypes about the experiences of the disabled, in large part, be-
cause of lack of experience with the disabled community.”); James A. Long, Note, Genetic Plastic
Surgery: How Neoeugenics Creates a Culture of Stage Moms, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 209 (2009)
(demonstrating how American sterilization and marriage prohibition laws fueled the Holocaust).
73. Kaveny, supra note 63, at 340.
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The language and behavior of government officials also contributes to
othering. Think back, for example, to the long and arduous struggle to inte-
grate schools—a struggle that in many respects is still going on. De facto
school segregation continued to exist for years after the 1954 Supreme
Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education.74 It continued because in
people’s hearts and minds, African-American persons were “other”; they
were dehumanized based on the color of their skin.75 And that othering was
fostered by the acts of executive officials in the South.76 George Wallace
vowed in his first inaugural address as Governor of Alabama,
“[s]egregation today . . . segregation tomorrow . . . segregation forever.”77
He pledged to “stand in the schoolhouse door”78 to prevent school integra-
tion and did exactly that. Think of what a powerful image that was—the
Governor of the state standing at the door of a University of Alabama build-
ing, blocking the passage of two students of color.79 The Governor of the
state, signifying to the people of Alabama that, those two students are not
us; they don’t belong with us.
Another example is the behavior of Hillary Clinton during the cam-
paign to determine the Democratic nominee for President in the 2008 elec-
tion. Behind in delegates, the perception of many people was that Clinton
adopted a campaign strategy that suggested a black man could not win the
presidency. As characterized by one party leader, “[s]he is saying, ‘he’s not
74. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Barbara A. Noah, A
Prescription for Racial Equality in Medicine, 40 CONN. L. REV. 675 n.107 (2008) (acknowledging
that de facto segregation of schools continued through the 1980s and 1990s).
75. See, e.g., Phillip Goff, Jennifer Eberhardt, Melissa Williams & Matthew Jackson, Not Yet
Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J.
OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 292–93 (2008) (discussing dehumanizing effect of implicit
association of African-Americans with apes).  Such attitudes continue to this day: race “is the
single most important predictor of support for welfare” because “in America programs that help
the needy are all too often seen as programs that help Those People.” Paul Krugman, Slavery’s
Long Shadow, N. Y. TIMES, June 22, 2015, at A17.
76. Prior to the Civil War and the subsequent enactment of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the othering of African-Americans was promoted by the
law itself.  “To put it bluntly,” in the words of John Noonan, “law was the medium and lawyers
were the agents responsible for turning one class of human beings into property.” See Noonan,
supra note 10, at 669–71 (discussing early court decisions addressing the status of slaves).
77. George C. Wallace, Governor of Alabama, 1963 Inaugural Address (Jan. 14, 1963). In-
terestingly, almost lost to history is the fact that Wallace first ran as a pro-integration candidate, a
position he discarded after losing the governor’s race. More significantly, also lost is the fact that
while he was governor, Wallace invested heavily in education and health care programs for blacks
and established free clinics and vocational schools that helped black and other low-income re-
sidents of his state.
78. See Governor George C. Wallace, Statement and Proclamation at the University of Ala-
bama (June 11, 1963). This speech became widely known as the “stand in the schoolhouse door”
speech.
79. To view a photograph and accompanying account of Wallace giving his infamous speech
in the schoolhouse door, see Jay Reeves, A Changed Alabama Remembers ‘63, CBSNEWS.COM
(June 11, 2003), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/06/11/national/main558016.shtml.
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one of us.’”80 The fear was expressed that Clinton’s statements “en-
courage[d] a sense that we are divided as a nation.”81 Again, this may or
may not have been her intent, but it is what was conveyed.
All of these things legitimate uncaring attitudes about the poor, about
racial minorities, about criminals. All in various ways involve the law and
legal officials not only condoning, but in some sense, fostering an attitude
that some people are worth less than others, that some people can be at best
ignored and at worst mistreated.
II. EFFECTS OF OTHERING ON ISSUES OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
I think there is very little question that this “othering” of which I speak
affects both our perception of many public policy problems and our evalua-
tion of solutions to those problems. Although this is true on any number of
issues,82 this Section selects several for purposes of illustration.83
The first is criminal law. There is a tendency to view people who break
the law and who are jailed for doing so as irrevocably other. Whatever may
have been their status before committing their crimes—and, in reality, a
significant number were already “other” on racial or economic grounds
before they engaged in any act in violation of the law—once convicted and
labeled “criminals,” they cease to be us. And they cease to matter in the
same way they would if they were us.
Sr. Helen Prejean—famous from her book Dead Man Walking84 and
for her efforts to secure a moratorium on the death penalty—believes that
our society only allows the death penalty because we don’t believe that
those who live on death row are human like us. They become so different
from us that we don’t even recognize them as a human being. People, in
fact, sometimes argue that certain criminals have forfeited their humanity
80. Peggy Noonan, Damsel of Distress, WALL STREET J., Feb. 9, 2008, at A11.
81. Id.
82. In addition to the three examples I discuss in the text, what comes to mind immediately is
the NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) reaction to residents of a particular area when it is proposed
that a halfway house or a home for developmentally disabled adults be built in the neighborhood.
See, e.g., Sam Verhovek, Neighbors Now More Likely to Oppose Jails and Shelters, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 23, 1987), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DEFDA1531F930A15757C0
A961948260; Shawn Reeves, Facing F.E.A.R., HABITAT WORLD (June/July 2004), http://www
.habitat.org/hw/june-july04/feature2.html. Although the term “NIMBY” once referred to opposi-
tion to a narrowly defined class of uses that arguably constituted a threat to property value, “in
wealthy communities across the New York region, the pitched battles are now over ball fields and
libraries, school buildings, churches and housing for the elderly—projects once seen as pillars of
an upright community.” David Herszenhorn, Now It’s ‘Nothing in My Backyard’; Just About any
Kind of Project Can Rile Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2000), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9E06EEDF1731F935A25757C0A9669C8B63.
83. In Section I.B.3, supra, I gave examples of how existing laws affect people’s views. Here
my focus is on how othering affects our perception of legislative or other public policy proposals.
84. SR. HELEN PREJEAN, C.S.J., DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE
DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1993).
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by the crimes they commit.85 Certainly support for the death penalty is not
expressed in those terms; people manage to frame support for the death
penalty in terms of deterrence, self-protection, or retribution.86 However
one frames the justification, the reality is that the criminal to whom the
death penalty is given is viewed as not us.
Nor is this attitude limited to death row inmates, so it has impact be-
yond the death penalty policies and laws. Ask yourself why there is so little
emphasis on and effort put into the reentry into our society of those who
have served their time in prison. According to the website of the Office of
Justice Programs of the U.S. Department of Justice, approximately 650,000
state and federal prisoners reenter society each year.87 When they do, they
face tremendous obstacles, including difficulty finding housing and em-
ployment, as well as health and substance abuse problems.88 Without help
in handling those problems, they will be—and are—rearrested and reim-
prisoned, creating a vicious cycle.89
To be sure, there are some programs aimed at assisting reentering in-
mates, but there are far too few.90 This means, in the words of one Urban
Institute report, that “an increasing number of prisoners are returning home,
having spent longer terms behind bars, less prepared for life on the outside,
with less assistance in their reintegration and, at best, strained connections
to their families and communities.”91
85. See, e.g., The Modern View of Capital Punishment: The Honorable Alex Kozinski vs.
Professor Stephen Bright, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1353, 1355 (1997) (quoting as summation of
sentiment shared by many who support capital punishment that “it is entirely appropriate for
society to deem some acts so evil, to be so demeaning of human life, that we can say the perpetra-
tor has forfeited his own life by committing them”).
86. There are a plethora of scholarly journals discussing the various justifications for the
imposition of the death penalty. For some examples, see Jason Borenstein, The Death Penalty:
Conceptual and Empirical Issues, 2 CARDOZO PU. L. POL’Y & ETH. J. 377 (2004); Claire Finkel-
stein, A Contractarian Argument Against the Death Penalty, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283 (2006);
David McCord, Should Commission of a Contemporaneous Arson, Burglary, Kidnapping, Rape,
or Robbery be Sufficient to Make a Murderer Eligible for a Death Sentence? An Empirical and
Normative Analysis, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (2009).
87. See Prisoners and Prisoner Re-Entry, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/
archive/fbci/progmenu_reentry.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2015).
88. Amy L. Solomon et al., Outside the Walls: A National Snapshot of Community-Based
Prisoner Reentry Programs, URB. INST., 12–16, 49–54, 81–84 (2004), http://www.urban.org/ Up
loadedPDF/410911_OTWResourceGuide.pdf [hereinafter Outside the Walls]; Amy L. Solomon et
al., Understanding the Challenges of Prisoner Reentry, URB. INST. (2006), http://www.urban.org/
publications/411289.html [hereinafter Understanding the Challenges].
89. See Outside the Walls, supra note 88, at 128–30.
90. See id. at 132–62.
91. Michelle Waul et al., Background Paper: The Effect of Incarceration and Reentry on
Children, Families, and Communities (U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., Working Paper,
No. NCJ 207444, 2002).
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Why are there far too few? Although by no means a complete an-
swer,92 I think part of the explanation may be that the view of far too many
people is that “they,” those who commit crimes, deserve to be punished. It
is not uncommon to hear some version of, “[l]ock them up and throw away
the key.”93 There is very little focus on what happens to prisoners on the
back end because they have ceased to be us.94
A second example relates to American “othering” of those from other
countries. In Section I, I talked about our reactions to atrocities or poor
conditions in other countries. We think very differently about Americans
than we do about non-Americans. This plays out in different ways. As a
practical reality, globalization has meant the global spread of unrestrained
capitalism. It has translated into larger and more powerful multinational
corporations with increasing power to impose their will on a broader range
of persons, which almost inevitably means more for the haves and even less
for the have nots. Globalization has translated into trade policies by the
governments of the industrialized nations that artificially protect their own
producers at the expense of those of developing nations.95 Even worse,
globalization sometimes also includes U.S. corporations profiting from
human rights abuses committed by foreign government entities.96 These as-
pects of globalization have sometimes been referred to as “economic
imperialism.”97
Our view of this activity is very much dependent on our vision of the
human person.  If “us” is the community of persons living in the United
92. Doubtless, the difficulty of re-integration also plays a role here. It takes a lot of energy
and effort to build community with those who have been imprisoned, especially where addictions
and mental illness play some role in their criminal behavior.
93. Read the Letters to the Editor section of any newspaper after a crime that has received a
lot of publicity and you will see expressions of such attitudes. See, e.g., Death Penalty: Punish-
ment of Worse Criminals Should Fit the Crime, SEATTLE TIMES (June 2, 2015), http://www.seattle
times.com/opinion/letters-to-the-editor/death-penalty-punishment-of-worst-criminals-should-fit-
the-crime/ (“dangerous monsters . . . must be permanently removed”). See also DEE COOK, CRIMI-
NAL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 169 (2006) (discussing othering of criminals).
94. I think this also explains why the United States has such restrictive felon disenfranchise-
ment laws; 35% of ex-felons in this country are permanently disenfranchised. See generally Chris-
topher Uggen, Barriers to Democratic Participation 1–2 (Urb. Inst., Working Paper No. 410801,
2002).
95. See Mary Durran, In World Trade, Cotton Fields Aren’t Level; Global Trade Meeting
Fails African Farmers, NAT’L CATH. REP., Oct. 10, 2003, at 4 (discussing $3 billion in subsidies
paid to American cotton farmers, resulting in their ability to flood the world market with inexpen-
sive cotton, preventing “West African farmers from competing even in their own domestic
market.”).
96. See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, Using Religion to Promote Corporate Responsibility, 39
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 892 n.213 (2004) (giving examples of connection between American
corporations and human rights abuses abroad).
97. Douglas M. Branson, The Social Responsibility of Large Multinational Corporations, 16
TRANSNAT’L LAW 121, 132–33 (2002) (calling “detrimental globalization” an economic imperial-
ism that “uses globalization as a bulldozer to crush resistance for the achievement of [the goals of
eradication of all borders so that the same products and services dominate all markets] by the
multinational corporations, which are the progenitors of economic imperialism”).
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States and we “other” those in the third world, we feel perfectly justified in
protecting American businesses at the expense of those in developing coun-
tries.  We lack a “global culture of solidarity attentive to the needs of the
weakest”98 and instead think of only parochial interests.99
We see the same effect of this lack of a global culture of solidarity in
our discussions about immigration reform. Advocating restrictive immigra-
tion policies at the same time that we exploit illegal workers in this country
represents the same kind of othering—those trying to get in are not us.100
One can find numerous other examples of how othering affects the
discourse over issues of law and public policy including the discourse of
feminist legal theory,101 the discourse of abortion,102 NIMBY efforts to use
98. Pope John Paul II, Address of John Paul II to the Members of the Vatican Foundation
“Centesimus Annus – Pro Pontifice” (May 9, 1998), https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/
speeches/1998/may/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_09051998_fondazione-cent-annus.html.
99. Some might suggest that it is not necessarily othering that produces this effect, arguing
that it may simply be that people find no time or inclination to care about things that happen far
away. There are more pressing issues closer to home. First, the issues closer to home are more
pressing to us precisely because of othering; the people nearer are more like us. Second, Ameri-
cans don’t react the same way to things far off. There is much greater American reaction to, and
concern for, problems in Europe than those in Africa or Asia. Why? Because when we look at
Europeans we see people that are more like us than are Asians and Africans.
100. See Kristin E. Heyer, Welcoming the Stranger: What Christian Faith Can Bring to the
Immigration Debate, AMERICA, Oct. 13, 2008, at 24 (talking about how immigrants are scapegoats
for many social ills and how media and political rhetoric of immigrants “encourages xenophobia
or ethno-cultural nationalism”; also discussing the juxtaposition of demonizing and scapegoating
of immigrants even as we “gladly accept the sweat and taxes they provide”).
101. In more general terms, the discourse of feminist legal theory provides another example of
how othering affects legal discourse. Some feminists have, at times, expressed concern over ap-
proaches to gender discrimination that seek different treatment for women. “Advocates of the
‘equal treatment’ position argue that women should strive for sex-neutral standards that deem-
phasize differences between the sexes.” Maxine N. Eichner, Getting Women’s Work that Isn’t
Women’s Work, 97 YALE L. J. 1397, 1399 n.8 (1988). See Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney,
The Miller-Wohl Controversy, in KELLY WEISBERG, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 156
(1993) (discussing differences among feminist theorists about meaning of equality). The concern
is that any difference in treatment, even if it favored women (such as for example, imposing
different weight and strength requirements for police officers), would ultimately lead to exclusion
and subordination. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist Legal Theory, 13 AM. U. J.
GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & LAW 13, 15–16 (2005) (citing concern of some feminist scholars that “any
recognition of difference or argument for ‘special treatment’ would operate to the disadvantage of
women”). This may reflect the sense that “[t]he history of gender discrimination in the United
States is littered with cases of ‘protective’ legislation and policies that, in reality, served primarily
to limit the rights and opportunities of women.” Deborah A. Calloway, Accommodating Preg-
nancy in the Workplace, 25 STETSON L. REV. 1, 22 (1995).  Difference in treatment would make
women other and, therefore, ultimately vulnerable to the forces of othering.
102. Although for some, the belief that human life begins at conception is a matter of religious
faith, that belief is supported by the fact that “at conception the new being receives the genetic
code. It is this genetic information which determines his characteristics, which is the biological
carrier of the possibility of human wisdom, which makes him a self-evolving being. A being with
a genetic code is man.” John T. Noonan, Jr., An Almost Absolute Value in History, in CONTEMP.
ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 281 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds., 4th ed. 1994).  More recent
DNA evidence about prenatal biology supports this view of the fetus as a “living, unique human
being.” Standing for the Unborn: A Statement of the Society of Jesus in the United States on
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zoning laws and other means to challenge the construction of facilities to
house those with mental illnesses,103 and our conversations about
poverty.104
III. A COMMUNAL VISION OF THE HUMAN PERSON
AND HUMAN RELATIONS
In some of my earlier writing I have discussed religion as a force with
the potential105 to promote a sense of communion and interrelatedness of
human beings.106 Here, I want to focus particularly on the vision of the
human person and of human relations articulated by Catholic Social
Thought, although I will suggest this vision is not wholly unique to Catholi-
cism and strands of it appear in other major world religions as well. This
Section discusses three principles or values deeply imbedded in Catholic
thought that promote a view of the human person and of human relations
that I will argue should both be promoted by the law and should serve as the
basis for our public policy decisions; principles that are antithetical to
othering.
A. Dignity of Human Person
The dignity of the human person is one of the most fundamental prin-
ciples of Catholic Social Thought.107 In his first encyclical, Redemptor
Abortion, AMERICA, June 2, 2003, at 19–20. Even if one wants to argue that what exists at concep-
tion is only the potential for life, the fact that we need to pass legislation called the Born-Alive
Infants Protection Act to force hospitals to provide medical care to infants who come through the
abortion process alive suggests the extent to which othering operates here. Born-Alive Infants
Protection Act of 2002, 1 U.S.C. § 8. The statute defines “born alive” as “the complete expulsion
or extraction from his or her mother of that member, at any stage of development, who after such
expulsion or extraction breathes or has a beating heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord, or definite
movement of voluntary muscles, regardless of whether the umbilical cord has been cut and regard-
less of whether the expulsion or extraction occurs as a result of natural or induced labor, cesarean
section, or induced abortion.” Id. § 8(b).
103. See generally, Anna L. Georgiou, NIMBY’s Legacy—A Challenge to Local Autonomy:
Regulating the Siting of Group Homes in New York, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 209, 209–11 (1999).
104. Think of the complete inability of John Edwards to “gain traction in his bid for the
Democratic presidential nomination” in 2008, a bid that was largely built on his passion for ad-
dressing poverty. Matthew Bigg, Edwards Bid Shows Poverty Not Big Campaign Theme, REUTERS
(Jan. 30, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN3024268420080130. When Ed-
wards kicked off the Half in Ten campaign with a speech on May 12, 2008, only one major
newspaper even covered the event. Peter Dreier, Edwards Poverty Campaign Met with Media
Blackout, THE HUFFINGTON POST (May 16, 2008), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-dreier/
edwards-poverty-campaign_b_101853.html.
105. I speak of “potential” because religion has, in many instances, been a factor contributing
to othering, as I discuss in Section I.B.1, supra.
106. See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, Workers in the Vineyard: Catholic Social Thought and the
Workplace, 6 J. OF CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 371, 410 (2008); Susan J. Stabile, A Catholic Vision of
the Corporation, 4 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 181, 202 (2005); Susan J. Stabile, Using Religion to
Promote Corporate Responsibility, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 847–78 (2004).
107. See SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH
IN THE MODERN WORLD, Gaudium et Spes ¶ 26 (Dec. 7, 1965), http://www.vatican.va/ archive/
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Hominis,108 Pope Saint John Paul II said that Christianity is an attitude of
“deep amazement” at the worth and dignity of the human person.109
The conviction of the dignity of the human person that animates Cath-
olic thought does not stem from any particular talent, fortune, or ambition
of the individual, or from one’s being born to any particular race, religion,
ethnicity, or gender. It stems, rather, from the fundamental tenet of the
Catholic faith, that all humans are created in the image and likeness of
God.110 In Mulieris Dignitatem,111 Pope Saint John Paul II wrote that:
[T]he human race, which takes its origin from the calling into
existence of man and woman, crowns the whole work of creation;
both man and woman are human beings to an equal degree, both
are created in God’s image. This image and likeness of God,
which is essential for the human being, is passed on by the man
and woman, as spouses and parents, to their descendants: “Be
fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it” . . . The
Creator entrusts dominion over the earth to the human race, to all
persons, to all men and women, who derive their dignity and vo-
cation from the common beginning.112
Our dignity as human persons, then, comes from God. It is rooted in
the mystery of creation and the creation of each of us in God’s image im-
plies that we are each sacred and precious and invested with a dignity that
requires equality of treatment. Being created “in the image and likeness” of
God, all humans partake of a divine nature. In the words of Saint Paul,
“[t]here is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is
neither male nor female: for you are all one.”113 God wills each one of us
hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html
[hereinafter Gaudium et Spes].
108. John Paul II, Encyclical Letter on the Redeemer of Man, Redemptor Hominis (1979),
http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_04031979_re
demptor-hominis.html [hereinafter Redemptor Hominis].
109. Id. ¶ 10 (“In reality, the name for that deep amazement at man’s worth and dignity is the
Gospel, that is to say: the Good News. It is also called Christianity.”). That dignity is not created
by Christ; rather, Christ’s redemptive act restores “dignity to man and given back meaning to his
life in the world, a meaning that was lost to a considerable extent because of sin.” Id.
110. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 1934 (2d ed. 1997) (“Created in the image
of the one God and equally endowed with rational souls, all men have the same nature and the
same origin. Redeemed by the sacrifice of Christ, all are called to participate in the same divine
beatitude: all therefore enjoy an equal dignity.”); PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE,
COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH ¶ 105 (2004) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM]
(in every person there exists “the living image of God”); Genesis 1:26–27.
111. John Paul II, Apostolic Letter on the Dignity and the Vocation of Women, Mulieris
Dignitatem (1988), http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_letters/1988/documents/hf_
jp-ii_apl_19880815_mulieris-dignitatem.html [hereinafter Mulieris Dignitatem].
112. Id. ¶ 6.
113. Galatians 3:28–29.
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into existence with love and God looks at each one of us and sees that we
are good.114
Not only are we created in God’s image, but this God who created us
in love dwells within us. Saint Ignatius’ Contemplatio ad amorem (the Con-
templation to Attain Love)115 is an invitation to consider:
[H]ow God dwells in creatures: in the elements, giving them exis-
tence; in the plants[,] giving them life; in the animals, conferring
upon them sensation, in [humans,] bestowing understanding. So
He dwells in me and gives me being, life, sensation, intelligence;
and makes a temple of me, since I am created in the likeness and
image of the Divine Majesty.116
If God dwells in me, then God so dwells in each human being. By this
indwelling, “God transforms every ‘human life into that which is sacred.’
Indeed, every human life . . . is a temple, ‘a dwelling-place of God.’”117
Every human life is sacred. Every human being is a temple, a dwell-
ing-place of God. Our eyes may see black, Asian, Hindu, Muslim, homo-
sexual, but we need to understand that what defines us as human beings is
the presence of God dwelling in each of us.118
Not surprisingly, given its origins in human creation in the image of
God, Judaism has a similar notion of the dignity of the human person. Com-
mon in the words of the Old Testament prophets is “the conviction that
every human being, simply by virtue of his or her humanity, is a child of
God and therefore in possession of rights that even kings must respect.”119
Islam has the same recognition of the divine origin of humanity, entitling
everyone to respect.120
It is easy to see the value of cultivating this kind of attitude. If we fail
to see the dignity of the human person, if we cannot recognize the equal
moral worth of all human organisms, it is easier to rationalize assigning less
worth to some subset of humans than to others. “[W]hen we fail to recog-
nize that human dignity is universal and carries with it certain inalienable
rights,” our tendency is to “demonize others.”121 We will rationalize as-
114. See Genesis 1:1–31 (stating that God looks at everything he makes and “finds it very
good.”)
115. The Contemplatio is part of the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius. See IGNATIUS OF
LOYOLA, SPIRITUAL EXERCISES OF ST. IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA ¶ 230–37 (Louis J. Puhl transl., 1968)
[hereinafter SPIRITUAL EXERCISES] . For a fuller description of the Contemplatio, see MICHAEL J.
BUCKLEY, S.J., THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY AS PROMISE AND PROJECT: REFLECTIONS IN A JESUIT
IDIOM 81–84 (1998) and Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., Ignatian Spirituality and the Life of the
Lawyer: Finding God in All Things – Even in the Ordinary Practice of the Law, 46 J. CATH. LEG.
STUD. 7, 18–21 (2007).
116. SPIRITUAL EXERCISES, supra note 115, ¶ 235.
117. Kalscheur, supra note 115, at 12 (quoting BUCKLEY, supra note 115, at 82). R
118. BUCKLEY, supra note 115, at 82. R
119. HUSTON SMITH, THE WORLD’S RELIGIONS 292 (1991).
120. Id. at 239.
121. See George M. Anderson, Roots of Genocide, AMERICA, Feb. 9, 2009, at 16, 19.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\12-2\UST206.txt unknown Seq: 22 17-FEB-16 12:45
402 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:2
signing less worth to some subset of beings in order for us to exert power
over them in the name of some other real or imagined good.  Such rationali-
zation is impossible if we see the inherent dignity of the human person.122
B. Solidarity
David Hollenbach has suggested that “a revival of commitment to the
common good and a deeper sense of solidarity are preconditions for signifi-
cant improvements in the lives of the poor.”123 He might just as well have
said that solidarity is a precondition for significant improvement in the lives
of all of those who are marginalized and “othered.”
The principle of solidarity recognizes that a basic element of human
existence is interdependence and relationship; living as human means living
in community.124 Solidarity reminds us of our relationship with other mem-
bers of our human family, i.e., that all are our neighbors, entitled to share in
the “banquet of life to which all are equally invited by God.”125 In Pacem
in Terris, Pope Saint John XXIII spoke of a “worldwide fellowship” of
persons.126 As expressed by Pope Saint John Paul II, solidarity “is not a
feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes of so
many people, both near and far.  On the contrary, it is a firm and persever-
ing determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is to say to
the good of all and of each individual, because we are all really responsible
for all.”127
122. See Damian P. Fedoryka, The Concept of ‘Gift’ as Hermeneutical Key to the Dignity of
the Human Person, 11 LOGOS 49, 62 (2008) (“Only to the extent that we see that ontological
preciousness and beauty of human beings that are their birthright prior to race, creed, ethnic ori-
gin, accident of birth, or accomplishment in life can we receive them and in doing so affirm
them.”).
123. DAVID HOLLENBACH, THE COMMON GOOD AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 173 (2002).
124. See Susan J. Stabile, CST 101: Basic Principles of Catholic Social Thought, 27 REVIEW
OF BUS. 7, 10–11 (2006) (describing generally the principle of solidarity); Susan J. Stabile, Catho-
lic Legal Theory, 44 ST. JOHN’S J. OF CATH. LEG. STUDIES 421, 424–25 (2005) (discussing indis-
pensability of community to the flourishing of the human person); COMPENDIUM, supra note 110, R
¶ 192.
125. Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter on Social Concern, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis ¶ 39
(Dec. 30, 1987), http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-
ii_enc_30121987_sollicitudo-rei-socialis.html [hereinafter Sollicitudo Rei Socialis]. In the words
of Thomas Massaro, “to invoke the virtue of solidarity as a central value of ethical life is to call
new attention to the relations among individuals. In order to be truly morally good, these relation-
ships must be characterized by mutual concern for the well-being of others and by a willingness to
make necessary sacrifices for the common good of the human community as a whole.” THOMAS
MASSARO, S.J. CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND UNITED STATES WELFARE REFORM 8–9 (1998),
describing solidarity as “a regulative norm for judging the working of social institutions”).
126. John XXIII, Encyclical Letter on Peace on Earth, Pacem in Terris ¶ 25 (1963), http://
w2.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem.html
[hereinafter Pacem in Terris].
127. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 125, ¶ 38. The virtue of solidarity is derived from the
recognition of interdependence among individuals and nations. Id.; see also Vatican Press Re-
lease, Solidarity and Subsidiarity to Overcome Social Exclusion, Feb. 6, 2009, http://212.77.1.245/
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Buddhists do not use the term solidarity. However, the Dalai Lama
speaks of the interdependence of all beings as a “fundamental law of na-
ture”128 and Mahayana Buddhism, in particular, places significant emphasis
on overcoming the delusion of a separate self and of developing an attitude
of cherishing others over the self.129 It also encourages development of an
attitude of “equal concern, equal regard, for everyone, . . .[one that sees]
that our present discrimination is based on arbitrary, mistaken and very
changeable labels.”130 The same wholehearted giving of the self is found in
the Islamic faith as well.131
Similarly, although the term solidarity may not be used within the Jew-
ish religion as a term of art as it is in the Catholic tradition, Judaism shares
a belief in the “interconnectedness of all life.”132 Martin Buber suggested
that fulfillment is possible only in true community, in the “unity of the
human community in the sight of God.”133 This translates in various ways
into a concern for others and there has been recent emphasis by some pro-
gressive Jewish groups on an understanding of the term “kosher” as involv-
ing more than merely food preparation and extending to how we treat those
who are traditionally “othered.”134
C. Family as the Paradigm for Human Relationship
In Catholic thought, the family is indispensable to the promotion of the
conditions necessary for the flourishing of the human person.135 That is
because it is in the family that we get our first revelation of our intercon-
nectedness as humans, learning that we are “not born as isolated, autono-
mous monads, but rather as a precious part of a social unit.”136
news_services/press/vis/dinamiche/d0_en.htm (quoting Archbiship Celestino Migliore on the
“logic of solidarity” as a means of ensuring well-being of all persons and social groups).
128. TENZIN GYATSO THE FOURTEENTH DALAI LAMA, COMPASSION AND THE INDIVIDUAL 5
(1991).
129. See DALAI LAMA, THE EIGHT VERSES OF THOUGHT TRANSFORMATION (Alex Berzin
trans., Nicholas Ribush ed., 1982), http://www.lamayeshe.com/otherteachers/hhdl/8verses.shtml;
Shosen Miyamoto, Freedom, Independence, and Peace in Buddhism, 1 PHILOSOPHY EAST AND
WEST 34 (Jan. 1952).
130. KATHLEEN MCDONALD, HOW TO MEDITATE 93 (1984).
131. HUSTON SMITH, THE WORLD’S RELIGIONS 239 (1991).
132. See, e.g., Ted Falcon, Life at Its Highest, REFORM JUDAISM, Summer 2003, at 11, 13, 15.
133. MAURICE S. FRIEDMAN, MARTIN BUBER: THE LIFE OF DIALOGUE 144 (1955) (quoting
Martin Buber, ‘Der Chaluz und seine Welt’[Auf Einer Redel], in ALMANACH DES SCHOKEN
VERLAG AUF DAS JAHR 5697 89 (1937)).
134. See, e.g., No Sweat: Jewish Camps Pledge to Buy Sweatshop-free Clothing, JEWISH TELE-
GRAPHIC AGENCY (Aug. 26, 2006), for discussion of the idea, for example of “kosher clothing.”
135. Christopher P. Vogt, The Family as Cornerstone of the Good Life and the Good Society:
Family Life in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, 27 REV. OF BUS. 13, 13
(2006).
136. Id. at 14–15.  It is true that as a matter of fact, the Catholic conception of family life is
not a reality. However, it is this vision of family life that is the Catholic model for all human
relation.  It is also the case that family is a group with the potential to “other” other people; in the
family we get our first sense of everyone outside the family as other. (This is particularly strong in
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However, the covenantal relationship within which we are born is not
one that exists only as family members. Rather than being a unique relation-
ship, the familial relationship is the blueprint for our relation to the broader
human community. Through the “complex of interpersonal relationships”
formed through marriage and family, “each human person is introduced into
the ‘human family’ and into the ‘family of God.’”137
Even in secular terms, it seems clear that it is easier to develop an
attitude of cherishing all others if we take as our paradigm our feelings for
those with whom we are closest. A Mahayana Buddhist meditation suggests
meditating first on the love for a mother as a method for developing a lov-
ing attitude toward all human beings.138
Some clearly would doubt whether this type of change in attitude is
possible. In an examination of the Deuteronomic commandment on usery,
Benjamin Nelson argues that “[t]he road from clan comradeship to univer-
sal society is beset with hazards,” specifically, a loss or attenuation of clan
bonds of love.139 He calls it a “tragedy of moral history that the expansion
of the area of the moral community has ordinarily been gained through the
sacrifice of the intensity of the moral bond,” suggesting “that all men have
been becoming brothers by becoming equally others.”140 Nonetheless, not-
withstanding his pessimism, he clearly views it preferable to attempt to em-
body norms that treat all people equally over “one in which there are
privileges for the insiders, temporary concessions for good neighbors and
strangers, and no obligation at all toward distant ‘barbarians.’”141
Extending the covenantal notion of family relationships to all persons
does not mean we as individuals can’t prioritize when making decisions, for
example, about limited resources and who we as individuals can help as a
practical matter. It may be that we have a greater obligation to those to
whom we are closest with, precisely because we flourish in community.142
But that is a practical limitation that does not say that those with whom we
are closest in community are more valuable than others.143 Acknowledging
some families, such as the kind of Italian family I grew up in.) But, again, here I’m talking about
the vision and the ideal put forth by Catholic thought.
137. John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation on the Family in the Modern World, Familiaris Con-
sortio ¶ 15 (1981), http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_exhortations/documents/
hf_jp-ii_exh_19811122_familiaris-consortio.html [hereinafter Familiaris Consortio].
138. See, e.g., DESHUNG RINPOCHE, THE THREE LEVELS OF SPIRITUAL PERCEPTION 240 (2d ed.
2003) (explaining that “most of us have a certain amount of affection or fondness for the people
we relate with through family”).
139. BENJAMIN N. NELSON, THE IDEA OF USURY: FROM TRIBAL BROTHERHOOD TO UNIVERSAL
OTHERHOOD 136 (1949).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 137.
142. Some might argue that this greater obligation flows from the principle of subsidiarity.
143. Hanna Wolff describes the story of Jesus and the Good Samaritan as describing a move-
ment from particularism “to a universalism that embraces the world and humanity.” HANNA
WOLFF, JESUS THE THERAPIST 127 (1978).
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that we are one family is key to the advancement of solidarity as a common
virtue.144
Together, the notions of human dignity and solidarity, along with a
sense that family provides a model for all human relations, provide a foun-
dation for a legal system that respects and honors the rights of all persons
and a model for how the law might serve as a positive force in countering
othering.  How the law might do so is taken up in Section IV.
IV. THE ROLE OF LAW IN MOVING FROM OTHERING TO COMMUNION
If our discussion of many polarizing legal issues is skewed by a view
of certain groups as other, then the question is how to change the terms of
the discourse—how do we encourage the development of a vision of per-
sons that does not other them? Rather than contributing to othering, law can
be a powerful force in combating it and the principles of Catholic Social
Thought I just identified serve to shape the values the law ought to promote.
Although what is required ultimately is a change in heart, which is not
accomplished simply by passage of the law, law plays an important part.
Just as the law can promote othering, it has the capacity to express and thus
promote values, such as human dignity and solidarity, which combat other-
ing. To be sure, some of what the law does is attempt to compel certain
behavior. However, equally—if not more—important, law can serve an ex-
pressive and pedagogical function in helping to foster cohesion.145
Cathy Kaveny advances a model of the law as “Moral Teacher,”146 a
model that recognizes that law “communicates something to its subjects
about the ways in which they should and should not go about living their
lives.”147 In addressing the question of what should be the lessons of the
law, she draws on the teachings of Aquinas to conclude that solidarity is
144. The covenantal notion of family also doesn’t mean we don’t chastise those whose behav-
ior is inconsistent with familial love.  Indeed, chastising those who stray is part of familial respon-
sibility. See Gregory C. Sisk & Charles J. Reid, Jr., Abortion, Bishops, Eucharist and Politicians:
A Question of Communion, 43 CATH. LAWYER 255, 267–68 (2004) (observing that “[t]o fully
achieve the joy and fellowship of full membership in our Catholic Church, we likewise must
accept the responsibilities that accompany that affiliation. In a truly loving home, wayward chil-
dren are called to account for their behavior and are instructed in how they must behave in order
to be restored to full communion with their siblings.”).
145. I don’t mean to minimize the value of laws that force behavior, such as antidiscrimina-
tion laws that prevent discrimination against certain classes. But we know from our history that
the passage of such laws are a necessary but not sufficient condition. I earlier noted the example
of school desegregation, which continued to exist for years after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Brown. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Mandating integration of schools
or banning forms of discrimination have no effect on implicit bias. See, e.g., Christine Jolls &
Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 (2006).
146. Kaveny, supra note 63, at 349–58. Kaveny argues that “some of the most important
pieces of legislation enacted in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century” are
explained by the conception of law as teacher. Id. at 354.
147. Id. at 350.
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one of the virtues that the law needs to teach.148 Similarly, John Noonan has
written about the power of law “to channel human energies toward coopera-
tive relationships, and to teach the basic values of society.”149
In terms of the law’s capacity to promote values that combat othering,
we are primarily concerned with the signaling effect of the law. That is, to
what extent do our legislative and judicial enactments and the language of
government officials promote human dignity, unification, and cohesion,
rather than a division and a sense of othering? As the following discussion
suggests, there are both easy answers and hard questions.
A. Easy Answers
Some potential approaches are easy and fairly direct. Antidiscrimina-
tion laws and laws punishing hate crimes send important signals. As limited
as they may be in addressing implicit bias, they provide strong statements
that certain groups may not be treated in a manner that adversely impacts
their dignity as persons.
It is not, of course, enough merely to have such laws on the books.
Self-evidently, for the law to have the appropriate signaling effect, the legal
system must behave as though we take such laws seriously.150 Regardless
of what the letter of the law says, the failure to enforce certain laws sends a
signal to the populace about what is or is not valued by those in power. “Do
as I say, not as I do” is never very effective. People pay attention to what
the law does, not just what it says. Indeed, the signaling function of en-
forcement efforts—or lack thereof—may be even stronger than the signal-
ing function of the laws themselves, at least where there is significant
publicity surrounding the action—or failure to act.
Other ways the law can promote values that counter tendencies to
“other” are more subtle. The law and the way we talk about the law conveys
a message apart from the substantive provisions it contains.
I’m talking in part here about the message conveyed by the laws them-
selves. Thus, for example, we need to ask whether our immigration laws
reflect compassion and a desire to help rather than simply the exclusion of
undesirables. Does our legislative approach to health care and poverty re-
flect a sense that poor people matter less? I am not making judgments about
what the particular content of the law in a particular area must be. Rather, I
148. Id. at 353. The other virtue she thinks is appropriate for law to promote in the United
States is autonomy, in the sense in which Joseph Raz uses the term, that is, in promoting a “vision
of the person situated in, and interacting with, a community, in order to develop an identity that
draws equally upon his unique talents and motivations and the opportunities provided by the
broader society.” Id. at 349.
149. M. Cathleen Kaveny, Listening for the Future in the Voices of the Past: John T. Noonan,
Jr., on Love and Power in Human History, 11 J. L. & REL. 203, 210–11 (1994–95).
150. PHYLLIS B. BERSTENFELD, CRIMES OF HATE: SELECTED READINGS 266–67 (2004) (stating
the fact that so few hate crimes reported result in prosecution “implicitly sends a message condon-
ing hate violence by failing to prosecute hate crimes”).
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am talking about an approach to evaluating the particular—a consideration
that has to be part of our evaluation of a particular law. So, for example, an
immigration law need not be one of completely open borders, but it must
recognize the dignity of those persons seeking life in the United States.
Similarly, avoiding othering does not require that we have national health
insurance, but whatever law we do enact must proceed from the premise
that it is unacceptable in our society for some people to lack access to af-
fordable health care and that the government has some role in addressing
that lack of access.
In part, I’m also talking about how government officials speak, recog-
nizing that how we speak about each other has a tremendous effect on the
people who hear that speech.151 We are beginning another Presidential cam-
paign season. Part of how we evaluate not only existing government offi-
cials, but also candidates for major political positions, ought to be whether
they speak in a way that is unifying or divisive. In particular, we need to
focus attention on how they speak about marginalized or unpopular groups
and how they speak about each other. Does their speech reflect an attitude
of a “global culture of solidarity”?152 Or does it tend to divide us along
race, gender, or other lines? And worse, does it do so in a way that suggests
the other is less than we are?
Professor Robert Pecorella has suggested that commutative and con-
tributive justice might entail “defining not just economic ‘floors’ beneath
which human beings should not be allowed to fall, but economic ‘ceilings’
which define the point when people of ‘good faith’ simply have enough.”153
Leaving aside the complexity of picking an upper limit and things like the
need to take into account regional differences,154 the idea that not only does
everyone deserve to have enough to flourish as a human person, but that
there is a point at the upper end that is enough and beyond which is simply
too much, is one worth thinking about. Yet, it is not in the cards for us to
think about such a solution where we other those who have less than we
have. It is worth asking what kind of effect there might be if our govern-
ment officials started preaching what one conference called a “Virtue of
151. J.B. White is someone who has written much on the power of language. See, e.g., J.B.
WHITE, LIVING SPEECH: RESISTING THE EMPIRE OF FORCE (2006). In the preface of this book, he
talks about the way language can “deny the value of ourselves and other people, and the activities
of life we share.”
152. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. R
153. Robert F. Pecorella, Property Rights, the Common Good and the State: The Catholic
View of Market Economics, 5 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 235, 276 (2008). Professor Pecorella is not
arguing that the government ought to define such a ceiling as a legal mandate. Rather, he suggests
that the Church ought to include such an idea as an aspect of what “should be expected within the
Catholic community.” Id.
154. See id. The same difficulties arise if we attempt to apply the same suggestion to health
care, for example. We could go a long way toward addressing health care costs by some system of
rationing care. However, any kind of health care rationing system would be extremely dangerous
absent a foundation of solidarity, rather than one of othering.
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Enough.”155 That might encourage a sense of obligation to use one’s sur-
plus to meet the needs of those without.
B. Harder Questions
To some extent, all laws make distinctions among people. They dis-
criminate or categorize, at least in the sense that the law generally favors
one group over another. A system of progressive income taxation means we
draw a distinction between higher income and lower income persons in how
much taxes we ask them to pay. Anti-discrimination laws permit airlines to
refuse to allow a pilot above a certain age to fly a plane. At the other end of
the spectrum, the law prohibits those who have not reached a certain age
from obtaining a driver’s license or from voting.
However, not all distinctions are devaluing; not all distinctions signal
that some are other.156 The problem is not with the law making distinctions;
the problem arises only when distinctions made in the law either create or
reinforce the sense that some people are valued less than others, distinctions
that negate the equal moral worth of all people.157 There is a vast difference
between a law that says blacks must sit at the back of a bus and a law that
says that a person under the age of eighteen cannot vote.
The difficult task, or course, is deciding which distinctions devalue
others and which are not morally questionable, a task that is complicated by
the fact that other important values may be at stake that might justify
othering.
In some cases, our desire to treat people differently stems precisely
from a desire to promote their dignity and to allow them the means to flour-
ish in community. Consider the example of affirmative action, a subject
which is often hotly debated. One may have various grounds for supporting
or promoting affirmative action, but it would be unfortunate if a superficial
appeal to othering—the suggestion that affirmative action separates blacks
and promotes othering—were permitted to short-circuit meaningful debate
about a measure designed to address the historical effects of a dehumaniz-
ing othering. The same is true of programs designed to aid the poor. Such
155. Extreme Wealth and Poverty and the Virtue of Enough, ST. JOHN’S U. (Oct. 17, 2009),
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/poster09.pdf.
156. See DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? (2008) (distinguishing be-
tween discrimination that is demeaning and fails to treat others as moral equals and treating people
differently where doing so is not demeaning). Starting from the premise that “it is often desirable
and sometimes necessary to treat people differently,” Hellman’s book is an exploration of the
question of “when discrimination is morally permissible and when it is not.” Id. at 4.
157. Hellman suggests that “drawing distinctions among people is morally permissible when
doing so does not demean any of those affected.” Id. at 169. I wouldn’t phrase it quite that way
because I am concerned not only with whether the subject of the discrimination feels demeaned,
but also whether it appears to the rest of us that the law is demeaning the subject of discrimination.
One would expect to see substantial overlap between those two ways of framing it, but the overlap
may not be total.
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programs clearly make distinctions—they single out the poor for distinctive
treatment. But they do so for purposes that advance human dignity, not
denigrate it.158
The short resolution is to suggest that distinctions that are motivated
by a desire to address particular needs of subsets of the population do not
promote the kind of othering with which I am concerned here. Where dif-
ferential treatment by the law aims to rectify that which prevents the flour-
ishing of the human person, where it doesn’t devalue, that differential
treatment is justified.
In other cases, the desire for the law to promote the kind of unity of
which I am speaking might run up against the values of freedom of associa-
tion and religious liberty. For example, what of a law that interferes with a
decision by a Christian student group to limit its leadership positions to
Christians?159 Or, what of a law that requires Catholic Charities to place
children for adoption with same-sex couples?160 Or a law requiring employ-
ers with a religious objection to artificial birth control to provide contracep-
tion coverage to their employees?161 Are such laws justified as efforts to
promote dignity and equality of treatment and to combat an attitude of
othering notwithstanding their impact on the freedom of association and
religion of the Christian student groups in the first instance and the religious
freedom of Catholic Charities in the second? Or are the values of freedom
of association and of religion sufficiently strong that they should be
respected notwithstanding their impact on the “othered” groups?
The resolution of these tensions is far more difficult. But the fact that
some situations raise difficult questions does not change the fact that the
law does provide signals and we need to be cognizant of what is signaled by
our laws.
158. Having raised the welfare example, let me also highlight the danger that my arguments
will be viewed as a stalking horse for redistribution. One could attempt to take my arguments in a
direction that says there can’t be winners and losers and must therefore promote a policy of redis-
tribution. However, as I suggested earlier, the problem is not the law making distinctions among
persons, it is what underlies those distinctions. There will always be people worse off and better
off in any society, but we can have that difference without the destructive kinds of attitudes I am
concerned with here.
159. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to decide whether a public university can re-
fuse to recognize a religious student group because the group requires its leaders to share its
religious beliefs. Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 319 F. App’x 645 (9th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, 558 U.S. 1076 (2009).
160. In 2006, Catholic Charities of Boston determined it had no choice but to cease its adop-
tion services because of a Massachusetts law that would require it to place children for adoption
with homosexual couples. Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, BOSTON
GLOBE, March 11, 2006, at A1.
161. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) the Su-
preme Court held that a closely held for-profit corporation with a religious objection could be
exempt from the contraception coverage provisions of regulations adopted pursuant to the Afford-
able Care Act if there is a less restrictive means of furthering the law’s interest).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\12-2\UST206.txt unknown Seq: 30 17-FEB-16 12:45
410 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:2
CONCLUSION
My ultimate concern is with changing attitudes, with replacing an atti-
tude of othering with one that sees all persons as brothers and sisters, as part
of the same human family. That is not a change that can be legislated into
existence. However, just as the law can promote othering, it can have a
positive effect in promoting a more cohesive view of human relationship.
That change in attitude is likely to then effect further changes in the law to
promote the dignity of all human persons. The law may not be capable of
creating a world populated by people willing to give up their lives for one
another,162 but it can do more than it does now to promote a vision that does
not accept othering.
I recognize there is a practical question of how possible it is to achieve
what I would like to see the law achieve in this area. We have a democratic
legislative process that does not necessarily take the broad public interest
into account. Often, those who are “other” do not have a place at the table
in which decisions are made about what the content of the law will be and/
or a place in deciding how the law will be enforced. And the rise of interest
group politics generally means a narrowing of concerns, a hardening of po-
sitions, and not one looking broadly at the public/human interest. I say this
to acknowledge that I’m speaking normatively about what the law should
do and about the direction in which it ought to move. Getting it to do that
will not be an easy task.163
162. John 15:13 (“Greater love has no one than this, that one lay down one’s life for his
friend.”).
163. What role, if any, legal education might play in this process is an interesting question, but
one that is beyond the scope of this article.
